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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze how pay-regime procedures affect antisocial behavior at
the workplace. In a real-effort experiment we vary two determinants of pay regimes:
discrimination and justification of payments by performance. In our Discrimination
treatment half of the workforce is randomly selected and promoted and participate in
a tournament (high-income workers) whereas the other half receives no payment (low-
income workers). Afterwards, antisocial behavior is measured by a Joy-of-Destruction
game where participants can destroy canteen vouchers. The data show that low-income
workers destroy significantly more vouchers than high-income workers. Destruction be-
havior is driven by workers who receive payments that are not justified by performance.
When all payments are justified, that is in our Competition treatment where all work-
ers participate in a tournament, the difference vanishes. By using a treatment with
random payments, we show that unjustifiably-paid workers destroy less when they had
equal opportunities to receive a high payment, i.e., when they were not discriminated
by the pay regime.
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1 Introduction
Antisocial behavior at the workplace describe actions which bring harm to an organization,
its employees, or its stakeholders (Griffin and Lopez, 2005). The occurrence of antisocial be-
havior is rare (Charness et al., 2013) and may lead to substantial efficiency losses. Empirical
evidence corroborate this and report that US firms lose about $50 billion each year because
of white collar crime, i.e., fraud and theft (Coffin, 2003).1 This emphasizes the importance
for management to create workplace environments that mitigate antisocial behavior.
In the organizational economics literature it is argued that antisocial behavior at the work-
place can be unleashed if there is a trigger, a so-called frustrator (Giacalone and Greenberg,
1997). Such frustrators can lead to experienced work dissatisfaction and therefore increase
workers’ engagement in antisocial activities. Examples for these triggers are controversies
with superiors (Geddes and Baron, 1997), coworkers (Skarlicki and Folger, 2004), or per-
ceived unfairness in an organization (Neuman, 2004).
Perceived unfairness may arise from institutional aspects such as pay regimes. One widely
used example are bonus schemes. Generally, these pay regimes generate income inequality
which can lower the well-being of workers (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Card et al. 2012; Bracha
et al. 2015). Besides that, a fair bonus scheme would require perfect monitoring of workers’
performance. However, pay procedures are often obscure and discriminatory since work pro-
cesses are complex and monitoring of effort and ability is imperfect (Berger et al. 2013). UK
data show that more than one-third of financial professionals believe that bonuses given to
top earners are unjustified and cause resentment in the office (CIMA, 2016).2 We argue that
discriminatory pay regimes, i.e., depriving workers of the opportunity to receive a bonus,
might serve as a frustrator. In particular, if (perceived) high performance is not rewarded,
workers might become resentful.
This paper investigates if discriminatory pay regimes lead to more pronounced antiso-
cial behavior among co-workers compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes. Especially
“unjustifiably-paid” workers, i.e., workers with a high (perceived) performance who receive
no compensation may feel frustrated. Finally, we examine if a discriminatory pay regime
lowers prosocial actions towards co-workers (Buser and Dreber 2015; Grosch et al. 2017). To
investigate the link of discriminatory pay regimes and antisocial behavior, we conduct a real-
effort experiment. In the experiment, we vary procedures in pay regimes and subsequently
1Similarly, Disselkamp (2004) reports that German firms bear costs of e 50 billion because of inner
dismissals, conflicts in the workplace, and high drop-out rates reflected in the number of staff on sick leave.
2The importance of procedural fairness is also emphasized in experiments, i.e., the redistribution decisions
of spectators are affected by the processes of income generation (Konow 2000; Cappelen et al. 2007; Cappelen
et al. 2013; Akbas¸ et al. 2016).
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measure worker’s engagement in antisocial (and prosocial) actions. In the Discrimination
treatment, half of the participants are randomly selected and receive a zero payment. The
remaining half of participants compete for bonuses. Here, relative performance within the
group of promoted workers determines payments, i.e., the 50% best-performing subjects of
the promoted workers receive e15, whereas the 50% least-performing participants from this
group receive e5. By contrast, in the control treatment Competiton all payments are justi-
fied by performance and there is no discrimination – all workers participate in a competition
for bonuses. The competitive pay regime is characterized by transparency of payments in
accordance to subjects’ relative performance. More precisely, workers who rank in the first
quartile receive e15, workers who rank in the second quartile receive e 5, and the 50% worst
ranked workers earn nothing. After subjects are informed about their payment from the
real-effort task, we measure antisocial behavior in a “Joy-of-Destruction (JoD)” game (Ab-
bink and Sadrieh 2009; Abbink and Herrmann 2011). Workers who received no payment
are paired with a worker from the paid group. Both subjects receive six canteen vouchers
and simultaneously decide how many canteen vouchers of their paired player they want to
destroy.
Experimental evidence demonstrates that people in JoD games enjoy harming others al-
though this action does not increase own monetary benefits (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009;
Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). Moreover, inequality-averse subjects in these settings often
burn money to equalize incomes (Zizzo 2003; Fehr 2016) and are willing to pay for it (Zizzo
and Oswald, 2001). Fehr (2016) finds that subjects burn money to retaliate sabotage behav-
ior. In our set-up, inequality in payments is kept constant across treatments. Still, individual
inequality aversion might partly explain why subjects destroy. We collect baseline measures
on individual inequality aversion (Blanco et al., 2011) before the crux of the experiment to
examine this channel. However, we believe that the source of inequality which emerges from
a discriminatory or a non-discriminatory pay regime affects fairness perceptions and thus
encourages antisocial behavior. After the JoD game, we implement a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma game to test if a discriminatory pay regime dampens prosocial behavior.
As expected, we find that low-income workers destroy a larger fraction of vouchers than
high-income workers. Inequality aversion only has explanatory power for non-discriminatory
pay regimes. Antisocial behavior is most pronounced in the Discrimination treatment com-
pared to the control treatments with non-discriminatory pay regimes. Interestingly, inequal-
ity aversion cannot explain the large destruction level under a discriminatory pay regime.
Here, the treatment effect is entirely driven by workers who receive an unjustified payment.
With another control treatment called Random we are able to disentangle the effect from
discrimination and unjustified payments. Only when unjustified payments result from a
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discriminatory payment procedure, workers become particularly resentful and engage in an-
tisocial behavior. Moreover, we find that discrimination crowds out prosocial behavior. That
is, workers show lower levels of cooperation under a discriminatory pay regime compared to
a non-discriminatory pay regime.
The findings of this paper may inhere interesting implications for organizational eco-
nomics and the choice of appropriate incentives. To emphasize this we test for external
validity and examine how different Big-5 personality traits (Costa and McCrae, 1989) link
up to our measure of antisocial behavior. This is motivated by empirical studies which
demonstrate that “neuroticism” and “agreeableness” are important predictors for antisocial
behavior (see for meta-analyses Jones et al., 2011; Miller and Lynam, 2001).3 It has been
shown, that workers with high scores in this trait engage in antisocial actions to a higher
extent. Our data suggest that observed behavior in the JoD game is a valid proxy for antiso-
cial behavior at work, i.e., “neuroticism” and “agreeableness” can partly predict destruction
behavior in our JoD game.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Experimental framework
The experiment consists of a short pre-survey, the main part with four stages, and an ex-
post questionnaire. The sequence of actions is illustrated in Figure 1. In stage 1, we collect
baseline measures on inequality aversion.4 Afterwards in stage 2, subjects engage in a real-
effort task under one of three treatments that used discriminatory or non-discriminatory pay
regimes. The third stage captures antisocial behavior with a “Joy-of-Destruction” (JoD)
game (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). Here, we measure how (non-)discriminatory pay regimes
affect antisocial behavior. For measuring spillover-effects on cooperative behavior, we apply
a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game (Blanco et al. 2014) in the final stage. The session
ends an ex-post questionnaire. The instructions can be found in the Appendix.
In what follows, we first discuss the experiment and then recap the surveys.
3For instance, the trait “neuroticism” measures emotional instability and the level of experiencing anger
and anxiety.
4Additionally, we capture social value orientation (SVO) before the two games on inequality aversion.
After the last stage of the experiment, we implement a die rolling game. We weave in SVO and the die
rolling game to use this data for another study on social preferences and cheating behavior (Grosch and
Rau, 2017).
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Figure 1: experimental sequence
Stage 1: Inequality Aversion (α and β) and Social Value Orientation
To measure inequality aversion, we apply the method of Blanco et al. (2011) and implement
two different games. The first one is to measure β, aversion to advantageous inequality, and
the second one serves to elicit α, aversion to disadvantaged inequality (see Fehr and Schmidt
1999).
For measuring β a modified dictator game is implemented. The dictator is confronted with
21 pairs of competing payoff distributions. One option, in which the dictator receives 20
tokens and the recipient 0 (20,0), is kept constant. The other payoff distribution holds equal
payoffs starting from (1,1), (2,2) etc. rising to (20,20) for dictator and recipient. Dictators
have to decide for a switching point at which they prefer equal outcomes to being ahead.
Participants’ β varies between -0.025 and 1 and increases with the level of aversion of being
ahead. After decisions are made, one of the 21 decisions is randomly drawn for payment and
one participant of a dyad is randomly selected for the role of the dictator who determines
payoffs.
To measure the parameter α that captures the acceptance of disadvantageous inequality, we
ask the responder in an ultimatum game for the minimum acceptable offer. First, partici-
pants in the role of the proposer are given 20 tokens and make an integer offer of x tokens to
the responder, keeping 20 tokens - x tokens to themselves. Responders have to indicate which
minimum first-mover offer they would accept. The lowest amount that can be accepted is
0 tokens for herself and 20 tokens for the other participant. This amount determines an
individual’s parameter α ranging from 0 to 4.5. The higher the parameter, the more a per-
son dislikes disadvantageous inequality. For calculating payments, we randomly draw one
of the 21 possible payment allocations and randomly select one participant in each dyad
for the role of the proposer and respondent respectively. If the minimum acceptance level
exceeds the offer, both earn nothing. Otherwise, the randomly drawn payment allocation is
implemented.
In the two inequality games, we apply an exchange rate of 1 token = e0.15. Across the
games at stage 1, we use stranger matching and strategy method. Participants are always
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informed about exchange rates from experimental currency to real currency at the beginning
of each game.
Stage 2: Real-effort task
During this stage, subjects work on a real-effort task in which we exogeneously vary the
pay regime. The task is to individually count zeros in 5 x 9 matrices consisting of random
numbers of zeros and ones for eight minutes. Participants know that after the completion
of the task half of the participants will be assigned to group A and half will be assigned to
group B. Participants A receive e 15 or e 5, whereas participants B receive a zero payment.
Information about group assignment and payment is done by distributing envelopes with
money (if any) and a card with a written ’A’ or ’B’ enclosed. To summarize, there are
three different payment groups: half of the workforce receives zero, 25% earns e 5 and
25% earns e 15. The pay regime, i.e., how participants are assigned to the groups, is our
treatment variable whereas the payment distribution among participants is kept constant
across treatments.
In three treatments, we vary two determinants of pay regimes in the real-effort task: (i)
discrimination to receive a bonus and (ii) justification of all payments by performance.
Under discrimination, half of the workforce is deprived of the opportunity to earn a bonus.
We define justified payments as a regime where better-performing workers receive at least as
much payoff as an equivalent-performing worker. These two channels are switched on and
off in the different treatments. A brief overview can be found in Table 1. We elaborate on
the design details of the Discrimination treatment and the two control treatments in the
following paragraphs.
Table 1: Summary of treatments
Treatment non-discriminatory all payments justified
Discrimination x x
Competition
Random x
In Discrimination, we create a pay regime with neither equal opportunities nor justified
payments for all workers. Participants are randomly assigned to either the role of a type-
A or a type-B worker. Type-B workers receive e0. Their performance is ignored when
determining the payoffs and therefore they are discriminated in this pay regime. In contrast,
type-A workers are ranked within group A based on their total number of correctly solved
matrices. The workers ranking in the upper half of the distribution receive e15 and workers
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ranking in the lower half receive e5.
In contrast to the Discrimination treatment, all participants are treated equally and all
payments are justified in the control treatment Competition. In this treatment, a performance
ranking among all participants is executed. The ranking determines the assignment to group
A or group B and the respective payments. Participants ranked in the first quartile of the
distribution earn e15, participants ranked in the second quartile of the distribution earn
e5. They are assigned to group A. The ones who are either ranked in the third and fourth
quartile receive a zero payment and are assigned to group B.
To control for the impact of receiving an unjustified payment under a non-discriminatory pay
regime, we run another control treatment called Random. In this treatment, the assignment
to groups A and B is imposed randomly as well as the ranking within group A. Consequently,
workers are paid independent of their performance. Still, each worker has similar chances
to receive a bonus or not and thus this pay regime is non-discriminatory. However, not all
payments are justified since some workers are not paid in accordance with their individual
performance. The treatment comparison of unjustifiably-paid workers between Random and
Discrimination enables us to disentangle the effects from discrimination and unjustified
payments.
Stage 3: Joy of Destruction (JoD)
We modify the joy-of-destruction game by Abbink and Sadrieh (2009). At the beginning of
this stage, each participant is virtually endowed with six canteen vouchers.5 A participant B
is matched with a participant A. Type Bs are informed about the exact payment (5e or 15e)
of the matched partner in the previous stage. Type As are informed that they are matched
with a type B. Every participant (type A and B) then decide simultaneously how many
vouchers between 0 and 6 they want to destroy from the matched participant.6 Decisions
are entered “virtually” on the screen and destruction is free of cost. Subjects know that a
random parameter, which destroys vouchers with 50% probability, is implemented. In this
case the computer randomly destroys 1–6 vouchers (subjects knew that all levels were equally
likely). In the other 50% of the cases the participant’s decision determines the number of
vouchers destroyed. The implementation of the random component reduces moral costs
since mean actions can be hidden under the guise of a possible random event (Abbink and
Herrmann, 2011). In real life, antisocial actions such as stealing from or bullying coworkers
5Students at the university hold a student identity card. This id card is used for paying meals at the
university’s canteen and can be loaded up with credit. With one of our vouchers participants could top up
their credit by e 1.
6Subjects know that destroyed vouchers would become useless for both subjects. To explain the mecha-
nism, we applied the wording “you can remove vouchers.”
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can not be traced back to one particular person in many cases. Only at the end of the
experimental session, we inform participants about the number of devalued vouchers.
Stage 4: Cooperative behavior
We use a sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma (Blanco et al., 2014) to measure cooperation.
All participants (independent of their type) are matched in dyads and receive no information
about the matched partner. The first mover makes a binary decision and chooses between
cooperate or not cooperate. The second mover responds either with cooperation or defection.
If both defect, both players receive a payoff of 10 Tokens. If both cooperate, they receive 14
Tokens each. If the first mover cooperates and the second mover defects, the first mover earns
17 Tokens and the second mover earns 7 Tokens (for a game-tree illustration see instructions
in the appendix). In this game we apply the strategy method: each participant makes one
decision in the role of the first mover, as well as two decisions (based on the two possible
decisions made by the first mover) in the role of the second mover. For determining payments
in this game one participant in each dyad is randomly selected into the role of the first mover
and the other participant is selected into the role of the second mover. We apply an exchange
rate of 1 token=e0.20.
Questionnaires
At the very beginning of the session, participants fill out a short pre-survey in which we
collect baseline measures on subjects’ mood and risk preferences.7 After the experimental
session, participants are asked about their fairness perceptions of the pay regime among other
questions about the experiment. Additionally, we capture character traits by query BIG-5
character traits (Costa and McCrae, 1989) and conduct post-experimental questionnaires.8
Finally, socio-demographic features such as age and study program are recorded.
2.2 Experimental procedures
We collected the experimental data from June to August 2016. In total, 252 students from
the University of Go¨ttingen took part in overall 13 sessions. In each session, we had 16 to
24 participants. The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects from various fields of studies were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
7For this purpose, we ask subjects to classify them based on their risk preferences on a scale between 1
(not prepared to take risks) and 10 (fully prepared to take risks) (Dohmen et al. 2012).
8We collect data on a measure for acceptance of hierarchies called “social dominance orientation” (Pratto
et al., 1994).
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The sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and subjects earned e17 (ca. $16) on average.
2.3 Hypotheses
In this section we derive our hypotheses. The real-effort framework is characterized by
bonus payments which lead to income inequality between (high-income) type-A and (low-
income) type-B workers. Hence, type-B workers who are matched with type-A workers
may suffer a utility loss because they particularly dislike disadvantageous inequality (e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Card et al. 2012). Experiments studying antisocial behavior report
that subjects burn money to equalize incomes (e.g., Fehr 2016; Zizzo 2003, 2004). In our
JoD game, if type-B workers code the income of the real-effort task and the value of the
vouchers on a single mental account, they might try to catch up to type-A workers by burning
vouchers. If other-regarding motives matter, the level of destroyed vouchers should depend
on type-B’s level of aversion towards disadvantageous inequality.
Hypothesis 1:
(a) Type-B workers destroy significantly more vouchers than type-A workers.
(b) The destruction level depends on the degree of type B’s aversion towards disadvantageous
inequality.
Giacalone and Greenberg (1997) argue that workers engage in antisocial behavior if they
are dissatisfied. Worker dissatisfaction may be induced by perceived injustice in the work-
place (Neuman, 2004). We vary an institutional aspect, discrimination of the pay regime,
that potentially serves as a frustrator. In the Discrimination treatment, type-B workers are
the ones that are discriminated by a random promotion mechanism. Therefore, they might
be particularly frustrated. In contrast, Competition is characterized by equal opportunities
for all workers. Moreover, no unjustified payments can occur. Hence, we expect that the
difference in destruction levels between type Bs and type As is more pronounced in Discrim-
ination than in Competition. We expect that being discriminated and being deprived of the
chance to receive a bonus, serves as a strong frustrator, especially for workers who received
unjustified payments.
Hypothesis 2:
(a) The difference in destruction levels between type B and type A is more pronounced in
discriminatory pay regimes compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes.
(b) Unjustifiably-paid workers destroy more than justifiably-paid workers.
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Beliefs about sentiments of co-workers might differ depending on the pay regime. Dis-
crimination of part of the workforce can lead to resentment within an organization (CIMA,
2016). Such an atmosphere of grudge might affect the willingness to cooperate with co-
workers. Based on that, we deduce our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
Workers are less cooperative under a discriminatory pay regime compared to workers under
a non-discriminatory pay regime.
3 Results
This section first reports the main results on destruction levels in the Joy-of-Destruction
Game (JoD). Afterwards, we focus on potential mechanisms such as inequality aversion
and the impact of unjustified payments under a discriminatory pay regime vs. a non-
discriminatory pay regime. Finally, we examine whether discrimination leads to ongoing
spill-over effects on cooperative behavior. When applying non-parametric tests we always
report two-sided p− values throughout.
3.1 Main results
Table 2 presents summary statistics on subjects’ decisions in our treatments. It overviews
workers’ average destruction levels and how often they decided to burn vouchers (destruction
frequency). The table also reports the average performance in the real-effort task, that is
the amount of correctly solved matrices.
Overall, the results show that on average type B destroys more vouchers (1.33) than type
A15 (0.87) and type A5 (0.65). The same pattern is supported by the data on the destruction
frequency, i.e., subjects destroy more often in Discrimination than in non-discriminatory pay
regimes. In what follows, we merge the data on destruction levels of A5 and A15 types as
they do not significantly differ between each other in any of the treatments.9 Turning to pay
regimes, the results confirm our expectations that antisocial behavior strongly depends on
discrimination of workers. The highest level of vouchers is destroyed in the Discrimination
treatment (1.23), it decreases down to 1.00 in Random where subjects have at least equal
9Data on destruction levels: all treatments, Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.457; data on destruction frequency:
all treatments χ2-tests, p > 0.500.
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Table 2: Summary statistics on destructive behavior and performance in the treatments
Discrimination Competition Random All data
destruction level
Type B 1.80 1.27 0.89 1.33
Type A5 0.70 0.42 0.89 0.65
Type A15 0.60 0.75 1.32 0.87
All data 1.23 0.93 1.00 1.04
destruction frequency
Type B 0.50 0.31 0.29 0.37
Type A5 0.20 0.21 0.32 0.24
Type A15 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.30
All data 0.36 0.27 0.33 0.32
performance (RE task)
Type B 30.65 24.60 23.58 26.21
Type A (A5 & A15) 29.43 36.69 25.29 28.58
Type A5 23.85 32.96 25.53 27.83
Type A15 35.00 40.42 25.05 34.06
All data 30.03 30.65 24.43 28.58
opportunities, and is lowest in Competition (0.93).10 Regarding the performance in the real-
effort task, we find no difference between Discrimination (30.03) and Competition (30.65).
In Competition, type assignment is dependent on performance by design and therefore type-
B workers perform significantly worse than type-A workers (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.001).
In the Discrimination treatment however, due to random assignment to groups A and B,
type-B workers have a similar performance as type-A workers (Mann-Whitney test, p =
0.751). Therefore, we claim that indeed that part of the workforce is discriminated in the
Discrimination treatment. Not surprisingly, subjects’ performance is lowest (24.43) in the
Random treatment where subjects’ remuneration is independent of their performance.
Generally, we find that type-B workers destroy significantly more (1.33) than type-A
workers (0.76) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.050) confirming Hypothesis 1a. Our main interest
is if discrimination serves as a frustrator and triggers antisocial behavior which is presumably
most pronounced among discriminated type-B workers. Figure 2 displays the average level
of destroyed vouchers in the treatments and standard deviations in parentheses from type-A
and type-B workers. In Discrimination, type-B workers destroy significantly more vouchers
(1.80) than type A workers (0.65) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.009). In contrast, in the non-
10These results are robust when focusing on destroy frequencies. The destruction frequency in Dis-
crimination (36%) is higher than in Competition (27%) (χ2(1) = 3.202, p = 0.074) and Random (33%)
(χ2(1) = 3.607, p = 0.058).
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Figure 2: Destruction levels and frequencies of type A and type B
discriminatory Competition treatment no significant differences can be observed between
the destruction levels of type Bs (1.27) and type As (0.58) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.198).
Similarly, in Random the destruction level of type Bs (0.89) is insignificantly lower than
the destruction level of type As (1.11) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.463).11 This confirms
Hypothesis 2a, i.e., the difference between antisocial behavior of type-B and type-A workers
is more pronounced in Discrimination compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes.
To summarize, the results show that a discriminatory pay regime leads to more pronounced
antisocial behavior between type-B and type-A workers than non-discriminatory pay regimes.
This is in line with our expectation that discrimination at the workplace serves as a frustrator
and ultimately evokes resentment and antisocial behavior. The non-existence of behavioral
differences between type As and type Bs in a random pay regime suggests, that indeed
discriminatory pay regimes and not only the presence of unjustified payments cause the
results.
Result 1:
(a) Type-B workers destroy significantly more vouchers than type-A workers under a dis-
criminatory pay regime.
(b) In non-discriminatory pay regimes, such as Competition and Random, there is no differ-
11These results are robust when focusing on destroy frequencies. In Discrimination type-B workers destroy
significantly more often (50%) than type-A workers (23%) (χ2(1) = 6.545; p = 0.011). No differences can
be observed between the destruction frequencies of type As (32%) and Bs (23%) in Competition (χ2(1) =
0.844, p = 0.358) and Random (type A: 29%; type B: 37%) (χ2(1) = 0.002, p = 0.963).
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ence in antisocial behavior between type-A and type-B workers.
In the next sections we will analyze the mechanisms of destruction behavior. In particu-
lar, we will examine the impact of inequality aversion and test Hypothesis 1b. Furthermore,
we test Hypothesis 2b. That is, we analyze the effect of receiving an unjustified payment.
Moreover, we compare unjustifiably-paid workers under a discriminatory pay regime with
unjustifiably-paid workers in a non-discriminatory pay regime. This way, we can further dis-
entangle the effect of discrimination per se from the effects of resulting unjustified payments.
We conclude this section by linking personality traits to antisocial behavior.
3.2 Mechanisms: inequality aversion
A potential source for workers’ destruction of vouchers may be inequality aversion. In this
respect, we will test Hypothesis 1b and analyze whether type-B workers use a single mental
account for monetary earnings and the value of vouchers. If they do, inequality-averse type-B
workers may try to catch up to the total income of type-A workers by burning their vouchers.
Type Bs are always behind type As in respect of incomes. A reduction of the income
inequality may work if Bs burn more vouchers than their counterpart.12 Figure 3 depicts
type Bs destruction levels conditioned on their aversion to disadvantageous inequality (α);
standard deviations in parentheses. The diagram conditions subjects on the median alpha
of the whole data set (0.93). We distinguish between type-B subjects with an above/below
median alpha.
Overall, type-B subjects with an above-median alpha averagely destroy more than work-
ers with a below-median alpha. In the control treatments (Competition, Random) Spear-
man’s rank correlation coefficients find significant positive correlations between workers’
aversion to disadvantageous inequality and destruction levels (Competition: ρ = 0.281,
p = 0.053; Random: ρ = 0.389, p = 0.016). In Competition, highly inequality-averse subjects
destroy significantly more vouchers (1.65) than subjects with a low inequality aversion (0.59)
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.050). Similarly, in Random workers characterized by high alphas
clearly remove more vouchers (1.24) than workers with low alphas (0.47) (Mann-Whitney
test, p = 0.054). This correlation does not exist in Discrimination, where destruction levels
of high-alpha (1.96) and low-alpha subjects (1.50) do not significantly differ (Mann-Whitney
test, p = 0.543). We therefore only find support for Hypothesis 1b in the non-discriminatory
12Note that if Bs are matched to A5s they could equalize incomes by destroying all of their vouchers.
However, equalizing incomes also requires that A5s do not destroy more than one voucher from type B if
A5s do not. Catching up to A15-workers is never possible for type-B workers.
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Figure 3: Destruction levels of type Bs conditioned on aversion to disadvantageous inequality
control treatments but not in Discrimination. Thus, antisocial behavior is obviously not
(solely) triggered by inequality aversion when discrimination is at hand.13
Result 2:
(a) Workers’ inequality aversion determines destruction levels in non-discriminatory pay
regimes.
(b) Inequality aversion does not predict destruction levels under a discriminatory pay regime.
The previous analyses have shown that type-B workers destroyed vouchers particularly in
the Discrimination treatment. Here, inequality aversion cannot explain the differences in
destruction levels between worker types. Next, we focus on an alternative explanation for
type-B workers’ antisocial behavior. Discrimination allows for unjustified payments resulting
from the random promotion mechanism. In the subsequent section, we examine the effect
of receiving a zero payment unjustifiably compared to a justified zero payment. Moreover,
we test if type-B workers become more antisocial if the unjustified payment results from
discrimination rather than from a totally random payment procedure.
3.3 Mechanisms: unjustified payments
There can be unjustifiably-paid workers in the Discrimination and the Random treatment.
The idea of a potential mechanism is that high-performing type Bs (who are aware of
13Focusing on beta we find that this measure proxies prosociality. That is, subjects with higher beta destroy
significantly less in Discrimination (ρ = −0.316, p = 0.047) and Competition (ρ = −0.250, p = 0.086) but
not in Random (ρ = 0.076, p = 0.651).
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this) become frustrated when informed about receiving a zero payment. When compar-
ing unjustifiably-paid workers from these two treatments, it is interesting to test if workers
feel more frustrated under a discriminatory vs. a non-discriminatory pay regime. To ad-
dress this, we compare the behavior of unjustifiably-paid workers in Discrimination with
unjustifiably-paid workers in Random. To identify unjustifiably-paid workers, we classify
workers based on their precision in the real-effort task, i.e., the share of correct answers.
Workers receive no feedback on their absolute performance. Therefore, we use the precision
in the task as a proxy for (perceived) ability assuming that workers who rarely make mis-
takes exert high effort, are eager to concentrate and can assess their performance well. As
a consequence of the simple task, high-ability workers should then be aware of their high
performance. For the precision measure, we use an indicator variable which takes on the
value 1 if type-B workers have a precision which is above the median of correctly solved
puzzles (83.90%).14 Indeed, we find a significant positive correlation between workers’ pre-
cision and their belief about belonging to the 50% best subjects in their session (Pearson’s
correlation coefficient, ρ = 0.132, p = 0.036).15 Therefore, conditioning subjects on their
work precision serves as a valid proxy of “perceived high performance”. In Discrimination,
type-B workers with an above-median precision achieve a significantly higher performance
(34.35) than workers with a low precision (25.65) (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.001). The
performance of high-precision type-B workers is significantly higher compared to all type As
in this treatment (29.43) (Mann-Whitney, test p = 0.038). Hence, we can argue that these
type Bs received an “unjustified payment”. The performance of low precision type-B work-
ers is significantly lower as compared to type As (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.051). Thus,
these workers received a “justified payment.” In Random we find similar results for high/low
precision type-B workers which we classify as unjustifiably/justifiably paid.16
Figure 4 displays destruction levels of subjects with unjustified/justified payments based
on our classification (standard deviations in parentheses). A noticeable finding is that de-
struction level is highest (2.39) for unjustified workers in Discrimination. These subjects de-
stroy significantly more than type Bs with a justified payment in Competition (1.27) (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.045). The data reveal a highly significant difference when comparing
14The calibration is based on subjects’ precision in our control treatments Competition, and Random.
15We asked all subjects about their belief of their relative performance right after they participated in
the real-effort task. At this stage they were not informed on the payment they would receive. The belief
elicitation was incentivized, i.e., subjects had to guess in a ranking to which quartile their performance
belongs. Subjects received e0.50, if they correctly guessed their quartile.
16Type-B workers with an above average high precision achieve a performance (28.22) which is significantly
higher compared to low-precision types’ (16.47) (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.001) and slightly lower than all
type As (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.083). Whereas, low-precision type Bs achieve a performance which is
significantly lower compared to all type As (Mann-Whitney test p < 0.001).
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type Bs’ destruction levels in Discrimination to the destruction levels of all (justifiably-
paid) subjects in Competition (0.93) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.007). When focusing on
unjustifiably-paid workers in a non-discriminatory pay regime, that is the Random treat-
ment, we find that destruction levels are significantly lower (0.70) than in Discrimination
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.051).
Figure 4: Destruction levels under “unjustified payments” and “justified payments”
No treatment effect can be observed in the destruction levels of justifiably-paid subjects
between Discrimination and Random (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.898). We conclude that
it is not only the receipt of an unjustified payment which frustrates workers per se. Instead,
workers become antisocial when unjustified payments result from discriminatory pay regimes.
Result 3:
(a) Unjustifiably-paid workers behave more antisocially than justifiably-paid workers.
(b) Unjustifiably-paid workers destroy more vouchers under a discriminatory pay regime com-
pared to a non-discriminatory pay regime.
3.4 Regression analyses
In the previous analyses, we found that inequality aversion can only explain workers’ mo-
tivation to destroy in non-discriminatory pay regimes. Furthermore, the analysis revealed
that unjustified payments trigger antisocial behavior in discriminatory pay regimes.
To better understand the functional interplay of discrimination, unjustified payments
and individual inequality aversion we now conduct ordered Probit regressions on destruc-
tion levels (Table 3). The dependent variable of our models corresponds to the number
of destroyed vouchers (0-6). The regressions include treatment dummies (Discrimination,
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Table 3: Treatment effects on destruction behavior of type B
destruction level of type-B workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Discrimination 0.435* 0.771** 0.192 -0.201 -0.229
(0.259) (0.379) (0.463) (0.817) (0.847)
Random -0.082 0.121 -0.281 -0.721 -0.802
(0.280) (0.383) (0.437) (0.827) (0.843)
Unj. Discrimination 0.973** 1.749** 1.786**
(0.493) (0.850) (0.837)
Unj. Random 0.782 0.189 0.175
(0.513) (0.824) (0.844)
Inequality Aversion
Alpha 0.184*** 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.175 0.162
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.108) (0.106)
Beta -0.798** -0.794** -0.986** -1.366 -1.385
(0.358) (0.363) (0.386) (0.873) (0.863)
Matching with type A
Matched A15 0.649* 0.675* 0.707* 0.705*
(0.386) (0.397) (0.408) (0.404)
Matched A15 × Discrimination -0.588 -0.299 -0.309 -0.271
(0.520) (0.633) (0.646) (0.650)
Matched A15 × Random -0.348 1.039 1.003 0.175
(0.560) (0.658) (0.704) (0.844)
Matched A15 × Unj. Discrimination -0.453 -0.354 -0.399
(0.702) (0.757) (0.752)
Matched A15 × Unj. Random -2.411*** 0.189 -1.990
(0.881) (0.842) (0.880)
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.064 0.103 0.115 0.117
Obs. 126 126 126 126 126
Inequality-Aversion Interactions NO NO NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Random) which are positive for the corresponding treatment. The omitted treatment is the
Competition treatment where all payments are justified. All regressions control for subjects’
aversion to disadvantageous inequality (Alpha) and advantageous inequality (Beta). Model
(2) analyzes the effect of the matched type A on B’s decision to destroy, i.e., Matched A15
is a dummy which is positive (zero) for a type A15 (A5). The model also adds interactions
between Matched 15 and the treatment dummies. In Model (3) we incorporate dummies
which analyze the effect of receiving unjustified payments in Discrimination (Unj. Discrim-
ination) and Random (Unj. Random). We refer to our classification applied in Section 3.3
i.e., the dummies are 1 (0) for an above-median (below-median) precision in the task. The
regression also controls for interaction effects of unjustified payments when matched with a
certain type A. Model (4) analyzes interactions between the inequality-aversion parameters,
the treatment dummies, and the unjustified dummies. Due to space limitations we report
these interactions in the Appendix. None of these interactions are significant.
Models (1)–(2) show that type-B workers who received an unjustified payment in Dis-
crimination destroy significantly higher levels than all type-B workers in Competition. By
contrast, Random is never significant, i.e., no treatment effects can be found between the
destruction behavior of low-income workers in Random and Competition. Model (2) finds
that the treatment effect between Discrimination and Competition is robust when con-
trolling for the income of matched type As. Generally, subjects destroy moderately more
vouchers from type-A workers who earned e15. However, the interactions of Matched A15
with Discrimination and Random are both insignificant. Thus, only type Bs in Competition
destroy more from A15s. This is emphasized by a Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient be-
tween destruction level and Matched A15 which is only significant in Competition but not
in Discrimination and Random.17
A conspicuous finding in Model (3) is that the treatment dummy Discrimination becomes
insignificant as soon as we control for the impact of unjustified payments. At the same time,
Unj. Discrimination is significant and positive. Hence, the treatment effect reported in
Models (1) and (2) is obviously driven by type-B workers who received an unjustified payment
in Discrimination. By contrast, we find no significant difference between unjustifiably-paid
workers in Random and all type-B workers in Competition, i.e., Unj. Random is insignificant.
This again confirms our previous results of Section 3.3. Turning to the interactions with
type As, we find that the significant effect of unjustifiably-paid type Bs is independent of
the matching type, which we conclude from the insignificant interaction Matched A15 ×
Unj. Discrimination. By contrast, Matched A15 × Unj. Random is negative and highly
17Competition: ρ = 0.267; p = 0.067; Discrimination: ρ = 0.112; p = 0.490; Random: ρ = 0.184;
p = 0.268.
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significant. Thus, unjustifiably-paid type-B workers in Random who are matched with A15,
destroy significantly less than all other type-B workers.
Focusing on inequality aversion, we generally find in Models (1)–(3) that type Bs who
are averse to disadvantageous inequality destroy more as Alpha is positive and significant.
At the same time, workers who are averse towards advantageous inequality destroy less, i.e.,
Beta is negative and significant. Importantly, this pattern vanishes in Model (4) where we
interact the inequality-aversion parameters with the treatment dummies and the dummies
of subjects who received unjustified payments. The treatment effect between unjustifiably-
paid workers in Discrimination and Competition is robust;, that is positive and significant.
Model (5) highlights that the latter finding also holds when controlling for covariates such as
female, age, and economics students. None of these covariates is significant. This confirms
the results we observed in Section 3.2. In Discrimination workers’ antisocial behavior is not
motivated by inequality aversion. Instead, unjustified payments matter.
3.5 Effects on cooperation
Our main results demonstrated that discrimination leads to more pronounced differences in
antisocial behavior compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes. In this section, we will test
Hypothesis III and assess if discrimination affects cooperative behavior as well. Cooperative
behavior is measured by using a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game which we played after
subjects made their decisions in the JoD. Therefore, these results might be interpreted as
longterm consequences on cooperative behavior and the work climate in general. Figure 5
reports first-mover cooperation levels (standard deviations in parentheses).
It can be seen that average cooperation rate is not significantly different in the non-discriminatory
pay regimes, i.e., 64% of the subjects cooperate in Competition and 63% of the subjects co-
operate in Random (χ2(1) = 0.003, p = 0.959). In contrast, in Discrimination workers show
a lower degree of cooperation (51%). The difference is weakly significant (χ2(1) = 3.330, p =
0.068). No treatment differences can be found for second-mover cooperative behavior.18
Result 4:
After experiencing a discriminatory pay regime, workers show lower cooperation levels com-
pared to non-discriminatory pay regimes.
18In Discrimination 65% of the second-movers are cooperating, 66% in Competition, and 68% in Random.
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Figure 5: Share of cooperating subjects (in %) across treatments
3.6 Post-experimental questionnaire
After the experimental session, we conducted an ex-post questionnaire where subjects had
to rate their fairness perception of the payment modalities in the experiments. Moreover,
we asked subjects who destroyed vouchers for their motivations to destroy.
Fairness perception
To elicit the fairness perceptions of payment regimes we asked participants: “How fair have
you perceived your payment from stage 2 in the experiment (counting task)? Decide on a
scale from 1 to 10, whereas 1 signifies very unfair and 10 represents very fair. With the
values in between you can grade your answer.”
We find in all treatments that type-A workers report a higher degree of perceived fairness
(Discrimination: 7.13; Competition: 7.54; Random: 6.97) as compared to type-B workers
(Discrimination: 3.45; Competition: 4.96; Random: 3.74). Mann-Whitney tests between
reported levels of type As and Bs are highly significant (all comparisons p < 0.001). No
treatment differences can be found between the reported levels of type As (all comparisons
p > 0.277). Turning to type-B workers we find that subjects in the Discrimination treatment
report a significantly lower perceived fairness than in Competition (Mann-Whitney test,
p = 0.002) and Random (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.020). Hence, the reported perceptions
indicate that type-B workers in Discrimination might experience highest frustration. This
is in line with our previous findings that low-income workers become more antisocial under
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discriminatory pay regimes compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes. The significant
lower level of perceived fairness in Random may be due to the fact that workers could be
disappointed when having no influence on their payments.
Stated reasons to destroy
All participants were asked about their reasons to destroy or not to destroy. We adjusted
the selection of answers for the two different actions. The reason that the payment was
perceived as unfair was majorly stated by 36% of type-B workers under Discrimination. In
the competitive environment, the majority of participant Bs (38%) justified their decision
by referring to the existence of the random destroy parameter as an excuse. Hence, those
subjects argued that even if they would not have destroyed vouchers, it could have happened
that the computer destroyed vouchers from the matched partner. In all treatments, 30% of
As and Bs explained to not having destroyed vouchers because they were satisfied with their
performance.
To learn more on the external validity of our findings, we now investigate if destroying
vouchers in the JoD game may be a proxy for antisocial behavior in the field in the next
section.
3.7 Personality traits and destructive behavior
Heterogeneity in personality traits can be a motive of destructive behavior. We proxy differ-
ent dimensions of personality with a reduced version of the widely used measure called Big-5
or NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1989). Meta-analyses from empirical
studies have demonstrated that the traits conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism
can be linked to antisocial behavior at the workplace (Jones et al., 2011; Miller and Lynam,
2001). Based on these studies, we briefly describe the traits and the predicted effect for
antisocial behavior in the following paragraph.
Persons that score high in conscientiousness have increased control over themselves and act
planned rather than spontaneously (Caspi et al., 2005). Our hypothesis is therefore that the
more conscientious people are the less they will destroy. We predict a similar effect for the
trait agreeableness, as it reflects kindness, empathy and trusting behavior. We expect a neg-
ative relationship for the trait neuroticism since a high score suggests emotional instability
and a tendency to experience anger and anxiety.
Table 4 presents ordered probit regressions on the impact of Big-5 personality traits on
destructive behavior for type-B workers. The dependent variable is the amount of vouchers
destroyed of the matched partner and ranges from zero to six. Spearman’s rank corre-
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Table 4: The effect of personality traits on antisocial behavior
destruction level of type-B workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BIG-5 neuroticism 0.026** 0.030**
(0.013) (0.013)
BIG-5 agreeableness -0.046** -0.055***
(0.018) (0.019)
BIG-5 conscientiousness -0.014 -0.012
(0.017) (0.017)
Random -0.224 -0.236 -0.291 -0.327
(0.280) (0.278) (0.279) (0.283)
Discrimination 0.424* 0.480* 0.436 0.493*
(0.253) (0.265) (0.278) (0.288)
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.048 0.036 0.048
Observations 126 126 126 126
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
lation coefficient tests reveals that the trait neuroticism is correlated with agreeableness
(ρ = −0.271, p < 0.001). Therefore, we run separate regressions for these character traits.
We include treatment dummies in all regressions and control for age, gender and economics
student in model specifications (2) and (4). In all four Models, we include treatment dum-
mies.
Regressions (1) and (2) confirm that higher emotional stability (lower score in neuroti-
cism) leads to more destructive behavior. Higher ranks in the traits agreeableness lead to
significantly less destruction in the JoD game. Also higher ranks in conscientiousness lead to
less antisocial behavior in our set-up but not significantly. All personality effects are in line
with our hypotheses. This way we suggest that destruction behavior in our experimental
set-up may be indeed comparable to antisocial behavior in companies (Jones et al., 2011;
Miller and Lynam, 2001).
Result 4:
The Big-5 personality traits neuroticism and agreeableness predict destructive behavior in the
JoD game.
22
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of discrimination at the workplace on employee frus-
tration and ultimately on employees’ engagement in antisocial behavior. Generally, we find
that a substantial fraction of workers engages in antisocial behavior which is in line with
other experiments in this area (e.g., Abbink and Sadrieh 2009; Abbink and Herrmann 2011;
Charness et al. 2013; Fehr 2016). In a discriminatory pay regime half of the low-income
workers destroy vouchers of a high-income coworker. Moreover, low-income workers destroy
the highest number of vouchers under a discriminatory pay regime compared to low-income
workers under a non-discriminatory pay regime. Interestingly, we find that low-income work-
ers behave just as high-income workers as soon as equal opportunities among the workforce
are guaranteed. More precisely, a competitive pay regime seems to make low-income workers
accept their payment as they engage less in antisocial actions and show more cooperative be-
havior compared to workers in a discriminatory pay regime. The questionnaire showed that
workers in a competition report a higher perceived fairness of the payment regime compared
to workers under a discriminatory pay regime.
At first, this insight may be surprising as competitive-market structures are often opposed
to cooperative behavior (Buser and Dreber 2015; Goette et al. 2012; Grosch et al. 2017). We
contribute to this literature in showing that a discriminatory pay regime can be even worse in
terms of (anti-)social interactions between coworkers than a competitive pay regime. In this
respect, competitive-market structures may work as a transparent remuneration mechanism
mitigating antisocial behavior of low-income workers. The reason is that all workers in such
a pay regime face equal opportunities for job promotions or bonuses.
A closer look reveals that in non-discriminatory pay regimes, antisocial behavior can be partly
predicted by individual social preferences in form of aversion to disadvantageous inequality
(Zizzo 2003). More precisely, low-income workers who are highly inequality averse destroy
more vouchers from a high-income worker in a regime without discrimination. Remarkably,
in a regime with discrimination inequality aversion is not the driving factor. Here, especially
unjustifiably-paid workers, that is workers who received a lower payment than deserved by
performance, become more antisocial than justifiably-paid workers. Using a stylized control
treatment called Random without discrimination but possible unjustified payments, allows
us to disentangle the effect of unjustified payments from discrimination. The comparison to
the Random treatment reveals that only unjustified and discriminated low-income workers
engage in more antisocial actions. As soon as equal opportunities are guaranteed, low-income
workers with an unjustified payment do not destroy more than justifiably-paid workers.
We are aware that we report the findings of a stylized laboratory experiment. To
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strengthen external validity, we successfully linked personality traits, i.e., the Big-5 per-
sonality traits, in our analysis with subjects’ destructive actions. Taken together with the
insights from empirical studies on the impact of personality traits on antisocial behavior
(Hershcovis et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2011; Miller and Lynam, 2001) we demonstrate that
destructive behavior in our experiment may be similar to antisocial behavior in real life.
Our findings contribute to managerial economics and the design of fair procedures in
pay regimes to mitigate worker frustration. A large strand of literature emphasizes that
workers’ intrinsic motivation is sensitive to the inappropriate use of financial incentives (e.g.,
Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Benabou and Tirole 2003; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012).
We draw on this and show that employees do not only respond negatively to the “wrong”
use of financial incentives per se. Instead, we emphasize the importance of the appropriate
design of pay institutions and highlight that intransparent pay regimes may cause antisocial
behavior. Due to the fact that antisocial behavior often raises high costs, these insights may
help to achieve higher workplace efficiency.
References
Abbink, K. and B. Herrmann (2011). The moral costs of nastiness. Economic inquiry 49 (2),
631–633.
Abbink, K. and A. Sadrieh (2009). The pleasure of being nasty. Economics Letters 105 (3),
306–308.
Akbas¸, M., D. Ariely, and S. Yuksel (2016). When is inequality fair? an experiment on the
effect of procedural justice and agency. Working paper .
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The Review of Economic
Studies 70 (3), 489–520.
Berger, J., C. Harbring, and D. Sliwka (2013). Performance appraisals and the impact of
forced distributionan experimental investigation. Management Science 59 (1), 54–68.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, A. K. Koch, and H.-T. Normann (2014). Preferences and be-
liefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis. Games and Economic
Behavior 87, 122–135.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, and H. T. Normann (2011). A within-subject analysis of other-
regarding preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2), 321–338.
24
Bowles, S. and S. Polania-Reyes (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences: substi-
tutes or complements? Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2), 368–425.
Bracha, A., U. Gneezy, and G. Loewenstein (2015). Relative pay and labor supply. Journal
of labor economics 33 (2), 297–315.
Buser, T. and A. Dreber (2015). The flipside of comparative payment schemes. Management
Science 62 (9), 2626–2638.
Cappelen, A. W., A. D. Hole, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2007). The pluralism
of fairness ideals: An experimental approach. The American Economic Review 97 (3),
818–827.
Cappelen, A. W., J. Konow, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2013). Just luck: An
experimental study of risk-taking and fairness. The American Economic Review 103 (4),
1398–1413.
Card, D., A. Mas, E. Moretti, and E. Saez (2012). Inequality at work: The effect of peer
salaries on job satisfaction. The American Economic Review 102 (6), 2981–3003.
Caspi, A., B. W. Roberts, and R. L. Shiner (2005). Personality development: Stability and
change. Annual Review of Psychology 56 (56), 453–484.
Charness, G., D. Masclet, and M. C. Villeval (2013). The dark side of competition for status.
Management Science 60 (1), 38–55.
CIMA (2016). Bonuses cause resentment at two-thirds of uk firms.
http://www.cimaglobal.com/Press/Press-releases/2016/Bonuses-cause-resentment-at-
two-thirds-of-UK-firms/ . [online accessed 13th December 2016].
Coffin, B. (2003). Breaking the silence on white collar crime. Risk Management 50 (9), 8–9.
Costa, P. T. and R. R. McCrae (1989). The neo-pi/neo-ffi manual supplement. Odessa, FL:
Psychological Assessment Resources 40.
Disselkamp, M. (2004). Kostenersparnis durch faire verhandlungsfuehrung und mediation.
pp. 171–202. Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Bund.
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, and U. Sunde (2012). The intergenerational transmission
of risk and trust attitudes. Review of Economic Studies 79 (2), 645–677.
Fehr, D. (2016). Is increasing inequality harmful? experimental evidence. Working Paper .
25
Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The
quarterly journal of economics 114 (3), 817–868.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Ex-
perimental economics 10 (2), 171–178.
Geddes, D. and R. A. Baron (1997). Workplace aggression as a consequence of negative
performance feedback. Management Communication Quarterly 10 (4), 433–454.
Giacalone, R. A. and J. Greenberg (1997). Antisocial behavior in organizations. Sage.
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000). Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Quarterly Journal of
Economics , 791–810.
Goette, L., D. Huffman, S. Meier, and M. Sutter (2012). Competition between organizational
groups: Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations. Management Science 58 (5),
948–960.
Greiner, B. (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with orsee.
Journal of the Economic Science Association 1 (1), 114–125.
Griffin, R. W. and Y. P. Lopez (2005). bad behavior in organizations: A review and typology
for future research. Journal of Management 31 (6), 988–1005.
Grosch, K., M. Iban˜ez, and A. Viceisza (2017). Competition and prosociality: A field
experiment in ghana. Working Paper .
Grosch, K. and H. Rau (2017). Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value
orientation. Technical report, Discussion Papers, Center for European, Governance and
Economic Development Research.
Hershcovis, M. S., N. Turner, J. Barling, K. A. Arnold, K. E. Dupre´, M. Inness, M. M.
LeBlanc, and N. Sivanathan (2007). Predicting workplace aggression: A meta-analysis.
Journal of Applied Psychology 92 (1), 228–238.
Jones, S. E., J. D. Miller, and D. R. Lynam (2011). Personality, antisocial behavior, and
aggression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (4), 329–337.
Konow, J. (2000). Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation deci-
sions. The American Economic Review 90 (4), 1072–1091.
Miller, J. D. and D. Lynam (2001). Structural models of personality and their relation to
antisocial behavior: a meta-analytic review. Criminology 39 (4), 765–798.
26
Neuman, J. H. (2004). Injustice, stress, and aggression in organizations. In R.W. Griffin
& A. M. O’Leary-Kelly (Eds.), The dark side of organizational behavior. John Wiley &
Sons.
Pratto, F., J. Sidanius, L. M. Stallworth, and B. F. Malle (1994). Social dominance orienta-
tion: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 67 (4), 741.
Skarlicki, D. P. and R. Folger (2004). Broadening our understanding of organizational retal-
iatory behavior. In R.W. Griffin & A. M. O’Leary-Kelly (Eds.), The dark side of organi-
zational behavior. John Wiley & Sons.
Zizzo, D. J. (2003). Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators. Eco-
nomics Letters 81 (2), 263–266.
Zizzo, D. J. (2004). Inequality and procedural fairness in a money-burning and stealing
experiment. In Inequality, Welfare and Income Distribution: Experimental Approaches,
pp. 215–247. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Zizzo, D. J. and A. J. Oswald (2001). Are people willing to pay to reduce others’ incomes?
Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 39–65.
27
A Appendix
Inequality-aversion interactions for Table 3
destruction level of type-B workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inequality Aversion
Alpha 0.184*** 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.175 0.162
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.108) (0.106)
Beta -0.798** -0.794** -0.986** -1.366 -1.385
(0.358) (0.363) (0.386) (0.873) (0.863)
Alpha x Unj. Base -0.163 -0.152
(0.242) (0.242)
Beta x Unj. Base -1.018 -1.068
(1.199) (1.203)
Alpha x Unj. Random -0.127 -0.0998
(0.204) (0.203)
Beta x Unj. Random 1.243 1.012
(1.136) (1.182)
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.064 0.103 0.115 0.117
Obs. 126 126 126 126 126
Covariates NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
B Appendix (Experimental Instructions)
Introduction
Welcome to the experiment. We are glad that you made time for participating today. Par-
ticipants earn at least e5 today. Depending on your decisions and the decisions of the
other participants, you may earn additional money during the experiment. We guarantee
your anonymity during and after the experiment. Please do not talk to other participants
and switch off your mobile phone. The experiment contains a small questionnaire, the ex-
periment with four phases and a concluding questionnaire. You will get instructions at the
beginning of each phase. Please look at your display now and answer the following questions.
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Phase 1
Phase 1a [Social value orientation]
We will now start with the instructions for phase 1. It contains three parts: 1a, 1b and 1c.
Please press “ok” and we will start with the instructions for phase 1a. Here, the computer
will randomly match you with another participant. Then, you and the matched participant
will simultaneously face multiple decisions. The identity of you and the matched partner
will not be revealed during or after the experiment. Decisions will be made in Tokens with
an exchange rate of 1 Token = 0.02 Euro. You will face six different decision sets. The
decision sets hold different payoffs for you and the matched participant. Below you can see
a possible example. Your personal payoff is displayed in the upper row “Sie erhalten” (“You
receive”). The payoff of the matched participant is displayed in the lower row “Anderer
erhaelt” (“Other receives”). You can choose between nine different allocations of Token be-
tween you and the other participant. In each of the six situations, you have to choose one
of the nine possibilities.
We describe two examples based on the decision set below: If you chose 2, you would receive
54 Token. The matched participant would receive 98 Token.
If you chose 6, you would get 72 Token. The matched participant would get 91 Token.
Role of A and B: The person in role A decides actively about money allocations. The
person in role B is passive and has to accept A’s decision. Each participant will decide in
role A. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign you role A or role
B (equally for the matched participant). If you get assigned to role A, your active decision
determines the payoffs and the matched participant has to accept the allocation. Similarly,
if you get assigned to role B, the matched participant is active (and you are passive) and
his/her decision determines the payoffs.
Payoff: At the end of this phase the computer randomly draws one of the six decision sets for
payment. Moreover, the computer randomly assigns role A and role B within the dyads. At
the end for payment, Tokens will be converted to Euro. We will inform you about the chosen
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decision set and which role (A or B) was assigned to you at the very end of the experiment.
Furthermore, you will learn about the resulting payoff of phase 1a. Please raise your hand
if you have any questions. If that is the case, we will come to your cabin to answer your
question in private. After all participants finished reading and all questions are answered,
we will start with decision-making in phase 1a.
Decision-making
[Translation: Sie erhalten = You receive; Anderer erha¨lt = Other person receives; Ihre
Auswahl = Your choice]
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Phase 1b [Inequality aversion (beta)]
We will now start with the instructions for phase 1b. In this phase the computer will ran-
domly match you with another participant. Afterwards you and the matched participant
will simultaneously face multiple decisions. The identity of the matched partner will not be
revealed during or after the experiment. Your decisions will be made in Token. The exchange
rate is 1 Token = 0.15 Euro. In this phase the person in role A will choose between two
possible distributions of Token between him-/herself and another person in role B. There
are 22 decision situations. Please read the following sections carefully before making your
decision.
The decision sets will be displayed in a table. Below you can see an example which is an
excerpt from the table. You will decide in role A. For the problem displayed below the choice
of LINKS [Translation: links = left] results in an outcome of 20 Token for yourself. The
choice of RECHTS [Translation: rechts = right] results in an equal outcome for you and
participant in role B of 5 Token each.]
The decision problems will be displayed in a table encompassing 22 decision sets. Below you
can see a screen shot of the table.
One single decision is relevant for all 22 decision situations: As you can see below the left
distribution is always the same for each of the 22 situations. You earn 20 Token and person
B receives 0 Token. The distributions on the right are always distributions with equal pay-
ment of you and person B. By clicking on RECHTS AB DER NA¨CHSTEN ZEILE RECHTS
[Translation: rechts ab der na¨chsten Zeile = right from the next row on) you can decide from
which distribution onwards you would prefer to choose distributions on the right. This means
you decide for LINKS in all previous lines. The decision from LINKS to RECHTS automat-
ically influences all 22 decision situations.] After clicking the button the lines will be colored
accordingly: All decisions you chose LINKS will be marked green and all decisions you chose
RECHTS will be marked blue.
Roles A and B: The person in role A has to decide between two possible distributions of
Token between him-/herself and person B. The person in role A can decide actively, whereas
the person in role B is passive and has to accept the decision of A. Each participant decides
in role A. At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly assign the roles A and B
within the dyads. If you get assigned to role A, your decisions will determine the outcome.
The matched participant will be in role B in this case and has to accept your chosen distri-
bution. If you are assigned to role B, the matched participant acts as person A and his/her
decision will be implemented. You have to accept this decision in this case.
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Payoff: The computer will randomly draw one of the 22 decision sets at the end of the phase.
The drawn decision set is the one that will be relevant for your payoff in this phase. Fur-
thermore, the computer will select if your own decision (role A) or the matched participant’s
decision will determine the payoffs. For payment, Tokens will be converted to Euro. We will
inform you about the chosen decision situation at the end of the experiment. In addition,
we will inform you if you were randomly assigned to role A or role B. Furthermore you will
learn the resulting payoff for phase 1b. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. If
that is the case, we will come to your cabin to answer your question in private. After all
participants finished reading and all questions are answered we will start with phase 1c.
Decision-making
[Translation: Links: Auszahlung Person A/B = left: payoff person A/B; Rechts: Auszahlung
Person A/B = right: payoff person A/B; immer rechts = always right; RECHTS ab der
na¨chsten Zeile = right from the next row on forwards]
Phase 1c [Inequality Aversion (alpha)]
We will now start with the instructions for phase 1c. In this phase the computer will
randomly assign a partner to you. Afterwards you and the matched participant will simulta-
neously face multiple decisions. The identity of the matched participant will not be revealed
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during or after the experiment. Your decisions will be made in Token. The exchange rate is
1 Token = 0.15 Euro.
In this phase all participants decide first as person A and afterwards as person B. Person A
has to choose one of 20 possible distributions of Token between him-/herself and the assigned
partner. Person B can either accept or reject the distribution person A will choose. If person
B accepts the proposed distribution, this distribution will determine the payoffs. If person B
rejected the distribution, both persons receive 0 Token. The computer will randomly select
the two participants in a dyad into the roles of person A and B.
Please read all of the following sections carefully before making your decision. First you de-
cide in the role of person A which share of 20 Token you want to offer person B. Afterwards
you have to decide as person B which of the 20 possible distributions you accept and which
money distributions you would reject. The decision problems will be displayed in a table.
On the next screen we will show you the table. You will see 21 decision sets and you will
decide from which distribution onwards you would accept the proposal of person A. After
clicking the distributions will be colored accordingly.
One decision is relevant for all 21 situations: You can see below that on the left side all pos-
sible distributions of the 20 Token are displayed. If you decide to click on Annahme ab der
na¨chsten Zeile [Translation: Annahme ab der na¨chsten Zeile = accepted distribution from
next row onwards] from a particular distribution, this means you are willing to accept all
subsequent distributions between person A and yourself. The accepted distributions will be
marked green. All previous distributions (where you would get less Token) will be refused.
Those are marked blue.
The computer decides randomly if you will be assigned to role A or role B. If you will
be in role A you will determine the payoffs if person B accepted your proposed distribution.
However, if person B rejected your proposed distribution you and person B get 0 Token. If
you will be in role B, you are passive and the other person in role A will determine the pay-
offs - however, only if you accepted that particular distribution. If that money distribution
was rejected according to your choice both you and person B get 0 Token. We will inform
you about your role, the decision and your payoff in phase 1c. Please show up if you have
any questions. If that is the case, we will come to your cabin to answer your questions. Af-
ter all participants finished reading and all questions are answered we will start with phase 1c.
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Decision-making
34
Decision-making
[Translation: Sie entscheiden in der Rolle als Person A = You decide in the role of person
A; Auszahlung Person A = payoff person A; Auszahlung, die Sie fu¨r Person B auswa¨hlen =
Payoff, you choose for person B]
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Decision-making
[Translation: Entscheiden Sie nun in der Rolle von Person B ab welcher Zeile Sie annehmen
wu¨rden = Decide now in the role of person B from which row on you would accept the distri-
bution; Annahme: Auszahlungen Person A/B = acceptance: payoff person A/B; Ablehnung:
Auszahlung Person A/B = rejection: payoff person A/B; Annahme ab der na¨chsten Zeile =
acceptance from next row on; immer annehmen = always accept; immer ablehnen = always
reject; Beider Personen erhalten = both persons receive]
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Phase 2 [Real-effort task]
[Comment: The instructions for phase 2 were handed out on paper]
[Treatment Baseline] In this phase you will participate in a task. Your display will show
matrices with the numbers 0 and 1. Below you can see an example:
[Translation: Sie haben 8 Minuten Zeit, um in dieser Phase mo¨glichst viele Tabellen zu
za¨hlen. Die verbleibende Zeit wird oben rechts angezeigt. = You have 8 minutes in this
phase to count matrices. The time that is left, is displayed on the top left of the screen.;
Wie viele Nullen befinden sich in der Tabelle? = How many zeros are in the matrice?]
Your task is to count the zeros in each of those matrices. Please enter your result in the
box below “How many zeros are in the matrix?”. Afterwards a dialogue box saying “Please
start now with the next matrix” will be displayed. Press “o”. A new matrix will pop up.
Your old result will still be in the result box. Please, simply delete it. You will have 8
minutes for this task.
Payoff of the task: After finishing the task, the computer will randomly select 12 participants
(of 24). Those will be called participants A and rewarded according to the number of correctly
counted tables. The other 8 participants are called participants B below and do not get a
reward for this task. Participants A will be ranked according to their performance. The
more tasks will be solved correctly the higher the ranking. The amount of payment for
participants A is linked to the ranking: Ranks 1-6 receive e15 cash each and ranks 7-12
receive e5 cash each. The payment of the task will take place right after completion. All
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24 participants will be handed in an envelope. If you are a participant A, the envelope will
contain money.
• You receive e15 if your performance is ranked 1-6. Furthermore you get a card with a
note that you are a participant A.
• You receive e5 if your performance is ranked 7-12. Furthermore you get a card with a
note that you are a participant A.
If the computer randomly draws you as a participant B your envelope will not contain money,
but a note that you are participant B.
[Treatment: Competition]
In this phase you will participate in a task. Your display will show matrices with the numbers
0 and 1. Below you can see an example:
(Translation: Sie haben 8 Minuten Zeit, um in dieser Phase mo¨glichst viele Tabellen zu
za¨hlen. Die verbleibende Zeit wird oben rechts angezeigt. = You have 8 minutes in this
phase to count matrices. The time that is left, is displayed on the top left of the screen.;
Wie viele Nullen befinden sich in der Tabelle? = How many zeros are in the matrice?)
Your task is to count the zeros in each of those matrices. Please enter your result in the box
below How many zeros are in the matrix?. Afterwards a dialogue box saying Please start
now with the next matrix will be displayed. Press “ok”. A new matrix will pop up. Your
old result will still be in the result box. Please, simply delete it. You will have 8 minutes for
this task.
Payoff of the task: After finishing the task the computer will calculate the ranking of all
participants. The more tasks are solved correctly the higher the ranking. The participants
on the first 12 ranks will be called participants and rewarded according to their ranking.
The other 12 participants are called participants B.
The amount of payment for participants A is linked to the ranking: Ranks 1-6 receive e15
cash each and ranks 7-12 receive e5 cash each. The payment of the task will take place right
after finishing. All 24 participants will get an envelope:
If you are a participant A, the envelope will contain money.
• You receive e15 if your performance is ranked 1-6. Furthermore you get a card with a
note that you are a participant A.
• You receive e5 if your performance is ranked 7-12. Furthermore you get a card with a
note that you are a participant A.
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If the computer randomly draws you as a participant B your envelope will not contain money,
but a note that you are participant B.
[Treatment: Random] In this phase you will participate in a task. Your display will
show matrices with the numbers 0 and 1. Below you can see an example: [Picture comes
here in original instructions. As examples were similar across treatments and to economize
see for the example in treatment Baseline above]
Your task is to count the zeros in each of those matrices. Please enter your result in the box
below How many zeros are in the matrix?. Afterwards a dialogue box saying “Please start
now with the next matri” will be displayed. Press “ok”. A new matrix will pop up. Your
old result will still be in the result box. Please, simply delete it. You will have 8 minutes
for this task.
Payoff of the task: After finishing the task the computer will randomly select 12 participants
(of 24). Those will be called Participants A below and rewarded independently of the number
of tasks solved correctly. The other 12 participants are called Participants B and do not get
a reward for this task.
To get the payoff for the participants A the computer creates a random ranking, which is
independent of the number of tasks solved correctly. The amount of payment for participants
A is linked to the ranking: Ranks 1-6 receive e15 cash each and ranks 7-12 receive e5
cash each. The payment of the task will take place right after finishing. Each of the 24
participants will get an envelope: If the computer selected you to be one of the participants
A, the envelope will contain money.
• You receive e15 if your randomly assigned performance is ranked 1-6. Furthermore
you get a card with a note that you are a participant A.
• You receive e5 if your randomly assigned performance is ranked 7-12. Furthermore
you get a card with a note that you are a participant A.
If the computer randomly draws you as a participant B your envelope will not contain money,
but a note that you are participant B.
...8 minutes pass by...
Do you think, you will become a participant A? Yes: , No:
[Oral information that envelopes will be distributed]
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Figure 6: [Translation: In the following, you can give an assumption about your own perfor-
mance compared to the other 11 participants. If you hit it, you receive e0.50 in addition.]
Phase 3 [Joy of destruction game]
Open your envelope now. Empty the envelope and put it aside. You learn now, if you have
been assigned to group A or group B. Information regarding the assigned group, can be found
on a laminated card, enclosed in the envelope. If you are a participant A, your ranking can
be found on the card’s back. Additionally, participant As will find their payment enclosed in
the envelope. If you have screened the content of your envelope, press “ok” and we continue
to the next phase.
• In phase 3, all participants A and B receive 6 vouchers e1 for the canteen.
• The computer randomly assigns a participant A to a participant B. Complete anonymity
is ensured during the experiment as well as after the experiment.
• Both participants decide at the same time, how many vouchers they want to remove
from the other participant. Removed vouchers are invalid and will not be received
by the participant who removed them. The following amounts of vouchers can be
removed: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
• Participants B will be informed who much (e5 or e15) the matched participant earned
in the counting task.
• Simultaneously the computer decides how many vouchers are removed from the par-
ticipant assigned to you, as well. Number of vouchers is thereby selected randomly.
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Following amounts of vouchers can be removed: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. They all have the
same probability to be selected.
• After you have confirmed your decision, with a probability of 50% either your decision
or the computer’s decision will become relevant.
• At the end of the experiment, will only learn about the remaining amount of vouchers
that they will receive. Thereby, we do not let you know, if the vouchers have been
removed by the other participant or from the computer.
Please press “OK” when you are done reading.
Decision-making
[Translation: Zugeordneter Teilnehmer: A (Verdienst, Arbeitsaufgabe: 15 Euro) = Assigned
participant: A (earnings, task: e15); lower box: How many canteen vouchers (0-6) do you
want to remove? The assigned participant will not be informed if you or the computer
has destroyed the vouchers. The computer will randomly destroy 0-6 vouchers. With a
probability of 50% your decision will be implemented. Otherwise the computer’s decision
will be implemented. The assigned participant makes a similar decision at the same time. I
remove the following amount of canteen vouchers: ]
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Phase 4 [Trust game]
We start with phase 4 now. In this phase, you are randomly assigned to another participant.
The participants are called Person 1 and Person 2 during this phase. Your decisions will be
made in Token. Thereby, the following exchange rate applies: 1 Token = 0.20 Euro
Your decision: In this phase, you have to decide in both roles (Person 1 and Person 2).
Deciding as Person 1, you can choose either LINKS or RECHTS (see image below). In case
you choose LINKS, Person 2 has to choose between LINKS and RECHTS, too. In case you
choose RECHTS, the game directly ends and Person 2 does not have to choose.
Image: The upper number presents the payment in Token for person 1. The lower number
presents the payment in Token for person 2.
In case both persons choose LINKS, both persons receive 14 Token.
If person 1 chooses LINKS and person 2 chooses RECHTS, person 1 receives 7 Token and
person 2 17 Token.
If person 1 chooses RECHTS, person 2 cannot choose and both persons receive 10 Token.
You will make your decision in the role of person 1 and person 2. In the last case, you have
to decide if you choose LINKS or RECHTS, assuming that person 1 chose LINKS.
Payment: At the end of this stage, the computer will randomly match you with another
participant from this room. Furthermore, the computer randomly assigns the two roles to
the two persons in the dyad. You will only learn your role at the end but not with whom you
were matched. After the matching and assignment of roles, the respective decisions of the
two participants will be implemented. Hence, your payment might depend on the decision
made by the participant that is matched with you, too.
Please show up if you have any questions. We will turn to you in private to answer any
questions. After all participants finished reading, and in case there are no further questions,
we will start with phase 4.
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Decision-making
[Translation: If the computer assigned the role of person 1 to you, would you choose LEFT
or RIGHT? If the computer assigned the role of person 2 to you and you know that person
1 had chosen LEFT, would you choose LEFT or RIGHT?]
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